However, recently a new theme has developed, one that President Obama is 'dithering' or 'wasting time' in providing General McChrystal with the troops he needs to 'win'. Leaving aside the obviously problematic assumptions that we will win if the General has enough troops, the accusation that Obama is taking too much time is patently wrong and suggests a rush to war that must certainly be avoided. Nonetheless this argument has become somewhat of a conventional wisdom with such respected COIN and defense establishment figures as Tom Ricks and Robert Kaplan arguing that Obama had better hurry up and provide the troops.
There are three central reasons why this is wrong. The first is a response to the claim that Obama made his decision in April and is now wavering in carrying it out. This position conveniently forgets the facts of the last several months--that Obama did send troops, 17,000 more to be precise, that the so-called vital summer that would determine the rest of the war has come and gone with little improvement in security, and that the failure of the Afghan election to produce a clear and legitimate government dealt a major blow to the chances of American success. These facts, and the resulting lack of any visible signs of improvement in Afghanistan, mean that the current strategy merits a thorough review before committing another 40,000 American fighting men and women to a conflict that has now lasted twice as long as World War Two.
The second reason why Obama should not be rushed is linked the first. The elections held in August were marred by immense corruption on a scale beyond what most foreign observers had predicted. The aftermath has been no prettier with discord within the UN mission, reluctance on the part of Hamid Karzai to acknowledge any fraud or to have a run-off and daily decreasing in Afghan confidence in their central government. Now that a run-off has been scheduled and will take place within the next several weeks, the United States should wait and see what the results are before committing a major policy shift. If the run-off produces at least the appearance of legitimacy and allows the formation of a government that the UN and ISAF can begin to depend on as a partner in counterinsurgency that is all well and good--it would even be an argument for adding troops. However, if the run-off is as plagued with corruption as the election was; if the run-off produces a result seen as illegitimate around the world and, more importantly, within Afghanistan; and if the run-off illustrates the unwillingness of Afghan political elites to join the counterinsurgency effort as a partner rather than a client, then that will be a powerful argument against committing more troops. ISAF cannot win this war without a partner. It does not necessary need an immediately strong power with robust governmental control--those can be built--but it does need a partner that truly wants to defeat the insurgency and is willing to incur the costs of achieving that victory.
Finally, the administration should take their time for the simple reason that they need to get this right. This is the last opportunity for a strategic assesement that is politically tenable no matter the decision. Future reviews will be ever more hamstrung by political considerations. Obama can now decide to up the troop level, keep it the same or even begin to implement a CT strategy that requires fewer troops and not face an impossible political situation here at home. He will not have that luxury six or eight months from now when the midterms are close and the Democrats desperate to maintain control of Congress--and after the midterm comes re-election. Thus, this is the last chance for the Obama administration to make a major upward change in our Afghan mission, and they need to get it right. The fact that the Afghan winter is approaching also allows them some leeway in terms of time. Delay would likely have major consequences almost any other time of year, but as the fighting slows somewhat over the next few months, in the short term we have time to properly deliberate and reach a considered conclusion.
The argument, then, that the president has waited too long and must decide now is wrongheaded. It may be that the best decision is to increase troops levels but even if that is the case, it must be a decision reached after careful consideration of all the alternatives. Nothing would be worse that speeding to an incorrect conclusion. Thus, the president should wait until after the run-off election, or longer if needed, to declare his strategy which can then be implemented with the full will of his administration, the armed forces and the country behind it.
