The resurrection of the US amphibious warfare fleet

A new and illustrative naval vessel was christened this week in San Diego. The USNS Montford Point, the first of the US Navy’s three planned Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP), was built by General Dynamics and is designed to obviate the need for large deepwater ports in amphibious operations.

The christening of the Montford Point, largely unremarked on in the mainstream press, is an illustration of the US Navy’s growing focus on amphibious and special operations capabilities. While the new Ohio-class submarine or the new Ford-class aircraft carriers get most of the attention, recent actions by the US Navy suggest it is also intent on restoring amphibious capabilities that stagnated somewhat thanks to 10 years of war in Iraq and land-locked Afghanistan.

The primary capability of the Montford Point is to provide a platform to distribute vehicles and equipment directly onto landing craft, particularly the LCAC hovercraft and its eventual replacement. The main deck is designed to be lowered below water level, by taking on ballast, so that LCAC can drive right onto it to pick up cargo. Instead of an interior ‘well deck’ found on many amphibious ships, the whole ship is essentially a well deck. In conjunction with a new logistics system, this class will replace the need for an amphibious force to take control of a major port–a difficult task which can become a vulnerable bottleneck.

The MLP class comes on the heels of the deployment last year of the USS Ponce, a retrofitted amphibious warfare ship now designed as a helicopter carrier, special operations platform, and, reportedly, a UAV base. Alongside the new America-class of assault ships (the first is to be commissioned this year) that provide large helicopter landing facilities, these vessels emphasize the US military’s aim of being able to have a strong presence anywhere in the world, without the need for expensive and controversial land basing. In addition, these platforms improve the ability of the United States’, particularly the Marine Corps, ability to deploy anywhere at short notice with a combined arms force while at the same time reducing replenishment concerns.

As Brett Friedman has demonstrated in the Journal of Military Operations’, the fact that the US is unlikely to mount a full scale amphibious assault in the near future does not mean amphibious operations are nonexistent, or even rare. Indeed, amphibious operations run the gamut from the purely humanitarian (the US Navy was able to immediately respond to both the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and the Japanese tsunami in 2011) to the military (support of the NATO Libya campaign) to everything in between (such as seabasing for counter-terror operations against Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines). Particularly as Western populace’s support for large ground operations diminishes and as budget cuts take effect, the ability to support operations from the sea for a relatively small cost is a great advantage.

Despite a focus in Washington on AirSea Battle and the expected rise of China to a near-peer competitor, it is these smaller missions that will, and should, continue to occupy the bulk of American naval and Marine Corps operations. While ‘big ticket’ items like aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines are important for the US’s strategic posture, it is ships like the Ponce, the Montford Point and the America that will be called upon to deliver disaster relief, support allied operations, and, if needed, become the tip of the spear for limited operations.

 

Cross posted at World Outline

The resurrection of the US amphibious warfare fleet

A new and illustrative naval vessel was christened this week in San Diego. The USNS Montford Point, the first of the US Navy’s three planned Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP), was built by General Dynamics and is designed to obviate the need for large deepwater ports in amphibious operations.

The christening of the Montford Point, largely unremarked on in the mainstream press, is an illustration of the US Navy’s growing focus on amphibious and special operations capabilities. While the new Ohio-class submarine or the new Ford-class aircraft carriers get most of the attention, recent actions by the US Navy suggest it is also intent on restoring amphibious capabilities that stagnated somewhat thanks to 10 years of war in Iraq and land-locked Afghanistan.

The primary capability of the Montford Point is to provide a platform to distribute vehicles and equipment directly onto landing craft, particularly the LCAC hovercraft and its eventual replacement. The main deck is designed to be lowered below water level, by taking on ballast, so that LCAC can drive right onto it to pick up cargo. Instead of an interior ‘well deck’ found on many amphibious ships, the whole ship is essentially a well deck. In conjunction with a new logistics system, this class will replace the need for an amphibious force to take control of a major port–a difficult task which can become a vulnerable bottleneck.

The MLP class comes on the heels of the deployment last year of the USS Ponce, a retrofitted amphibious warfare ship now designed as a helicopter carrier, special operations platform, and, reportedly, a UAV base. Alongside the new America-class of assault ships (the first is to be commissioned this year) that provide large helicopter landing facilities, these vessels emphasize the US military’s aim of being able to have a strong presence anywhere in the world, without the need for expensive and controversial land basing. In addition, these platforms improve the ability of the United States’, particularly the Marine Corps, ability to deploy anywhere at short notice with a combined arms force while at the same time reducing replenishment concerns.

As Brett Friedman has demonstrated in the Journal of Military Operations’, the fact that the US is unlikely to mount a full scale amphibious assault in the near future does not mean amphibious operations are nonexistent, or even rare. Indeed, amphibious operations run the gamut from the purely humanitarian (the US Navy was able to immediately respond to both the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and the Japanese tsunami in 2011) to the military (support of the NATO Libya campaign) to everything in between (such as seabasing for counter-terror operations against Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines). Particularly as Western populace’s support for large ground operations diminishes and as budget cuts take effect, the ability to support operations from the sea for a relatively small cost is a great advantage.

Despite a focus in Washington on AirSea Battle and the expected rise of China to a near-peer competitor, it is these smaller missions that will, and should, continue to occupy the bulk of American naval and Marine Corps operations. While ‘big ticket’ items like aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines are important for the US’s strategic posture, it is ships like the Ponce, the Montford Point and the America that will be called upon to deliver disaster relief, support allied operations, and, if needed, become the tip of the spear for limited operations.

 

Cross posted at World Outline

Sulu standoff in Malaysia threatens peace treaty amid growing violence

My first article for World Outline, a news and analyst website run by former KCL War Studies folk. Check out their website.

The standoff between Sulu fighters and security forces in Malaysia has worrying implications for both Malaysian politics and a peace deal in the Philippines.

In a story that has largely escaped the attention of the western news media, the standoff between Sulu raiders and Malaysian police is now affecting relations between the two countries, the Malaysian political climate, and the success of a vital peace treaty in the Philippines.

Since the group of approximately 100 ‘invaders’ from the Sulu archipelago arrived near the Sabah town of Lahad Datu in early February, they have been surrounded by Malaysian security forces. However, since a failed raid last week, violence has become a recurring theme and between 27 and 31 people have been killed thus far.

Arriving by speedboat nearly four weeks ago, Jamalul Kiram III and his followers occupied a village, claiming part of Sabah territory for the Sultan of Sulu and his heirs. Several of the group claim to be the Sultan’s descendants. While only the latest chapter in a long-running dispute over who rightfully controls the region, this attempt to take Sabah by force is a new and unwelcome development. The violence began late last week when the Malaysian police attempted to storm the village. Two security officers and twelve of the Sulu fighters were killed in the firefight that ensued. Then, on Saturday, a group of Malaysian troops were apparently ambushed, while in a separate incident several more Sulu fighters were killed – bringing the death toll to approximately 20.

The fighting continued on Sunday and there have been reports that hostages have subsequently been taken. However, several of the news reports contradict each other and there is – as yet – little agreement on the exact number of people killed. Nevertheless, what is clear is that the situation has deteriorated dramatically and is causing wider problems for both the Malaysian and Philippine governments.

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak is required to call elections before the end of June and these events have thrown the campaign into disarray. The opposition has capitalised on the attack as proof of lax border security and the inability of the current government to protect Malaysians.

There are also an estimated 800,000 Filipinos living legally in Sabah who are facing a potential backlash. These concerns have caused the Philippines’ Foreign Secretary to fly to Malaysia in an effort to urge ‘maximum tolerance’ between the two populations.

Even more worryingly, across the straits the delicate peace agreement between the Filipino government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has been put at risk. After initial conciliatory statements, President Aquino last week called on the Sulu fighters to surrender ‘without conditions’. The Moro leader Murad Ebrahim responded by accusing the president of throwing fellow Filipino Muslims to the ‘Malaysian wolves’. Neither side has yet suggested delaying the final peace treaty, but the conclusive end of a 30+ year conflict is being put at risk by continued violence.

There is little doubt that the Malaysian security forces will eventually retake control of the villages and expel the remaining Sulu fighters. How it is done, and how long it takes, however, remains to be seen. The Malaysian government can little afford delays their perceived ability to protect Malaysian borders and the residents of Sabah, but a bloodbath is in no one’s interest and would fuel dangerous tensions between Sabah’s Malaysian and Filipino populations.

Finally, although the Philippine peace treaty is likely to be finalized, a bad ending to the standoff greatly increases the possibility of a breakaway group that would reject the deal. Much as the Islamic Liberation Front did 30 years ago when they broke away from the Moro National Liberation Front, this group would continue the insurgency in the Philippine archipelago, affecting Malaysia and the Philippines alike. That is a result all parties would do well to avoid.

Thinking about the Straits of Hormuz

Commander Dolan’s May 2012 Proceedings article suggests that the US Navy should respond to potential Iranian aggression in the Straits of Hormuz from a distance, engaging the Iranian navy in the Arabian Sea and IRGC assets in the Persian Gulf from over-the-horizon. He argues that Iranian A2/AD capabilities are such that, in order to conserve the force, the US should not contest the Straits and littoral waters directly; the US navy should instead position its forces to wear down and defeat Iran’s assets from afar. This strategy would potentially mean surrendering control the straits to Iranian forces for a brief period of time but, he argues, would safeguard US ships and provide a more certain method of defeating the Iranians.

While Commander’s Dolan’s ideas are provocative, his analysis does not deal comprehensively with Iran’s most potent capabilities which are difficult, if not impossible, to deal with from a distance.  In addition, if Iran were to close the Straits, even temporarily, alternative oil routes need to be found—and options are limited. While the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline does allow some Emirati oil to bypass the straits, its capacity is less than 9% of the Straits’ daily traffic. Given the limitations of alternative routes, the US navy has focused on confronting the Iranians within the Straits. This brief analysis outlines major Iranian capabilities and the deployments the US has made in an attempt to counter them.

Iran’s primary force in any Straits-closure attempt would be the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Navy utilizing mines, small boats (both torpedo and missile craft), and land-based anti-ship missiles. The Iranian Navy only operates outside the Gulf and poses a significantly smaller threat. Dolan’s article focuses primarily on IRGC-N’s missile threat and, accurately, articulates a standoff strategy to defeat it. The US navy would position guided missile ships and carrier-based planes in the North Arabian Sea to counter land, air, and sea-launched Iranian missiles. However, this strategy only deals with the most vulnerable third of Iran’s assets.

Mine warfare could cause havoc in the constricted space of the straights, particularly among merchant vessels. The US Navy is aware of this threat and has deployed 8 of its 14 Mine Counter-Measure (MCM) ships to Bahrain. Additionally, IMCMEX12, the region’s largest ever naval exercise, is currently underway with 30 national navies working together to practice MCM techniques. However, US MCM ships are approximately 20 years old and are limited in number. Their supposed replacement, the Littoral Combat Ship with an MCM unit, has yet to be deployed. Thus, though any attempt by IRGC-N to lay mines would result in the US Navy quickly sinking the mine-laying ships, the resulting minefield would still necessitate a weeks-long clearing process.

 The threat of IRGC small-boat-swarming tactics, armed with both anti-ship missiles and torpedoes, is an equally worrisome issue. These small craft, ranging from inshore patrol boats to coastal fast attack craft, are generally armed with anti-ship missiles (many of Chinese origin) or torpedoes. The US Navy’s response has been the forward deployment of 5 Cyclone-class patrol boats at Manama, with an additional 5 thought to be sent forward within the last 6 months. The US Coast Guard also maintains a permanent presence of 6 patrol boats in Bahrain. However, given the IRGC-N is thought to have anywhere between 75-150 small craft, the US presence is certainly not decisive and could find themselves overwhelmed by sheer numbers. Finally, Iran operates a series of submarines (Qadir-class mini sub and several Russian built Kilo class). US Navy ASW abilities suggest that smaller Qadir-class is the more potent threat to Gulf shipping. However, their short range and questionable combat effectiveness would likely limit their operations to the coastal waters of Iran.

Any attempt by Iran to close the Straits would, therefore, be a combined operation of surface ships utilizing missiles and torpedoes, land-based anti-ship missiles and a mine-laying campaign. This three-pronged approach creates difficulties for a US Navy that has focused on standoff weaponry and large, expensive, high-capability ships. However, this asymmetric conflict design does not mean the US Navy cannot regain the initiative.  By utilizing both existing MCM and patrol ships assets alongside over-the-horizon capabilities, the US can puts itself in the best position to deny Iran the ability to close the Straits.

Standoff weaponry, including carrier-borne aircraft, should be positioned in the Arabian Sea to confront IRIN assets outside the Straits, destroy IRGC-N missile systems, and provide air cover and ASW capabilities inside the Gulf. Meanwhile, MCM ships and USN/USCG patrol boats, alongside helicopter MCM from Bahrain, would be assigned the mission of dealing with IRGC-N small boats and mines. There would likely be losses within this latter group (US Navy simulations in 2011 suggested swarming tactics could sink up to 16 US ships in the Gulf). However, if the US is to remain a guarantor of the free flow of commerce in the region, it must demonstrate a willingness to take on Iran directly and prevent closure of the Straits. This two-pronged response to Iranian aggression allows the US Navy to use its standoff advantages to defeat Iranian A2/AD and static capabilities while at the same time offering an in-situ defense against small boats, mine-laying and ship-borne missile attacks. Maintaining the free flow of commerce through the Straits in the face of Iranian aggression is both extraordinarily important and difficult. For this reason, the US rightly dedicates significant assets both inside and outside the Gulf to ensure Iran is not able to halt the flow of oil.