What explains the lack of LeT 'spectacular' attacks given the success of their 2008 Mumbai operation?

Accounting for the lack of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) attacks on India since 2008 requires evaluation of several analytical levels, namely organizational, state and international. There are two clusters of reasons for LeT’s lack of attacks: first, internal LeT dynamics that have affected the group’s operational choices and, second, pressure applied by, and to, Pakistan’s ISI. The second set of reasons is dominant given the ISI’s influence and strength. A further contributing factor is the improvement of Indian counter-terrorism, particularly regional intelligence hubs and the new National Investigation Agency, though these advancements are certainly not determining factors.

The 2008 Mumbai assault was a departure in size, though not in style, from previous LeT activities. The group’s fidayeen attacks, begun in July 1999, generally involved 2-4 gunmen, meaning Mumbai was a significantly larger operation. American LeT operative David Headley’s plea deal indicates the shift was due to internal LeT politics, notably the need to retain control of and inspire younger, more extreme members, who were increasingly focused on Afghanistan rather than LeT’s traditional Kashmiri-centric area of operations. This explains the decision to increase the attack’s size during the final preparations. Mumbai should, therefore, be seen as a one-off ‘spectacular’ designed to reinvigorate the group and enhance its cohesion. It was not the beginning of a large-scale fidayeen offensive. In addition, by 2008 LeT had shifted its focus to concentrate on supporting and financing the Indian Mujahideen (IM) group. LeT was instrumental in setting up IM and supporting its bombing campaign but has never had operational control. LeT support for IM has continued, most notably with the 2010 Pune bombing.

LeT’s ideology, the final internal dynamic, suggests it sees further terrorism in India as counterproductive. LeT promotes Ahl-e-Hadith Islam and its ideology minimizes intra-Muslim conflict while concentrating on attacking non-believers. It is, therefore, supportive of Pakistani national integrity, which would come under serious threat if further Mumbai-like attacks occurred. This position was elucidated by Hafiz Saeed, leader of LeT’s charitable arm Jama’at- ud-Da’wah. He said that although LeT wants change within the Pakistani state, Pakistan is a defender of Muslims and thus LeT will not do anything that could damage the country. It is relatively unsurprising, therefore, that LeT has not implemented a major terrorist assault in India since 2008 because neither its organizational goals, ideology nor current strategy suggest it requires one.

LeT’s internal dynamics arguing against further terrorism in India complement the external forces dictating the group’s actions. Pakistan’s ISI and Military Intelligence have always maintained significant influence over the group due to their similar recruiting areas in Punjab; the fact that the government built the group’s military capabilities throughout the 1990s for use as a proxy force; and the suspected fact that the ISI maintains case officers for important LeT operatives. In addition, the ISI has guided the LeT’s organizational evolution in order to allow the group’s continued operation while providing Pakistan with plausible deniability. Pakistan’s security services possess, therefore, a high level of control over LeT activities and operations; indeed, David Headley has claimed that his ISI handler, a Major Iqbal, was aware of the Mumbai targets and assisted operational planning.

After the Mumbai attacks, the US and India, along with the international community, put significant pressure on the Pakistani government to crack down on Kashmir-focused militant groups. American pressure in particular forced Pakistan to create a new strategy for its relationship with LeT. According to regional expert Anatol Lieven, author of the new book Pakistan: A Hard Country, and others, the new Pakistani strategy has been to ensure LeT does not attack either India or the West while at the same time retaining its ties with the group and ensuring it maintains its military capabilities. This approach has allowed Pakistan to maintain both its proxy force and needed international relationships. The Pakistani government and LeT understand that striking India in the short-term would damage Pakistani national interests and could provoke a full-scale war. The LeT and Pakistani security forces have been allies for 20 years because of this confluence of ideological and strategic viewpoints. It is this shared view, combined with the influence applied by the ISI, that accounts for the lack of LeT attacks in India since 2008. 

Militarization of America: A work in progress?

Earlier this week Dan Trombly and InkSpotsGulliver had an interesting back and forth on the usage of the term militarization to describe America's ever-increasing reverence of the military. It was prompted by a letter in protest of NBC's new piece of horrendous reality television 'Stars Earn Stripes'. While Trombly and Gulliber's discussion was mostly about whether the term militarization was a good place-holder for a more complex process, one that both described as 'fetishization of the military', the question raises a broader point about the expansion of militaristic ideas and processes within American society and what exactly woud constitute militarization. 

In my mind there is little question that 'fetishization of the military' has become a cultural norm over the last decade or so. There are a wide variety of indicators, several of which are touched on in a few posts by Jason Fritz over at Ink Spots. Perhaps the one that's gotten the most attention is the Stolen Valor Act, which, while prohibiting a very distasteful action, ran roughshod over first amendment protection of expression no matter how vile. Other recent instances would include the political argument over early voting in Ohio and the aforementioned television show. 

However, while it is silly to suggest these data points represent the militarization of American culture, Keith Boyea made a very good point on twitter suggesting that fetishization of the military would like precede actual militarization. With that in mind, it is worth considering a few other changes to US culture over the last several years that point to an increasingly weaponized and military-minded America. Whether they represent outright militarization is difficult to say and for what it's worth I don't think it does--yet. 

One of the most obvious shifts in America's weaponization has been the purchase by local police departments of ever-heavier weaponry and vehicles. I'm not talking about major, or even small, cities investing in SWAT-like units, which I see as completely reasonable. I'm discussing small town police departments where there are often no more than a few dozen officers, if that, but they still have vehicles suitable to operations in Afghanistan (are MRAPs really needed on the small-town streets of America?) and where the standard sidearm carried by officers is supplanted by assault weapons. This shift towards a police force that resembles more of a para-military force in appearance (though obviously not in action or creed) would suggest America is an increasingly unsafe place reliant on authority's possession of heavy weaponry to keep the peace. That's, to put it mildly, not a positive trend.

Obviously much of the increased firepower found in small-town police departments is a response to the increasing power of the weaponry available to civilians and, therefore, criminals. However, the end of the gun control battle (for all intents and purposes the NRA won when Senator Ron Johnson said high capacity magazines were a constitutional right) is also a sign of America's shift toward a weaponized culture. The complete lack of restriction on gun purchases and gun ownership has meant Americans are more heavily armed than ever. More worryingly, however, is the slow disintegration of the background check culture that allows people like disturbed individuals like James Holmes or white supremacists like Wade Page (who the FBI was already aware of) to get their hands on a high-powered and perfectly legal arsenal. When the crazies can get legal guns it's unsurprising that law-abiding citizens want the ability to protect themselves via concealed weapons and that the police demand heavier weapons. Without some sensible restrictions on gun purchases (I see no reason why a 24-hour waiting period/background check shouldn't be instituted. Whoever needs a gun 'right now' probably shouldn't be getting one) America's gun possession stats will continue to rise right alongside the number of gun-related deaths each year. 

The final indicator of America's more gun-happy culture is a foreign policy-related one (as an IR guy, there had to be an international touch to this....). Increasingly America does not have a foreign policy it has a military policy. Budgets are often cited to demonstrate this (State's total budget is something like 10% of the Pentagon's base budget) but it goes deeper than that. Americans now see interactions with other states primarily through the lens of military action. The idea of drawn out diplomatic and economic wrangling is seen as both ineffective and not American enough. This is a problem among elites as well as the mass population and on the right as on the left. Calls for military action in both Syria and Iran point to America's view of military force as a fix-all when generally it is anything but. This is a cultural shift and is part of the fetishization of the military discussed above but has weakened US diplomats and diplomacy.

These are merely observations of how America has shifted over the last ten years or so towards a more weaponized society, one that sees the individual ability to deliver physical violence as a net plus, and views American strength solely in terms of military power. While America is certainly not a militarized society, are these not some of the characteristics that one might expect of a society on the road to militarization?

 

 

Victory means different things to different people

Adam Elkus has an interesting post up at Rethinking Security arguing that 'end of victory' theme, he gives examples from Anne Marie Slaughter and Andrew Bacevich, is seriously mistaken and, in fact, immoral because it opens the door for military action risking the lives of US soldiers without proper goals and strategy. 

The danger in believing that victory is passe is that we might use force without the intent of winning. Once we have decided on a policy goal and have formulated a strategy to achieve it, we should intend to win. Otherwise, what was the point of deciding to use force to begin with? 

While I think he's right to argue against the use of force without the will to win, I think he's missing an important point. Due to the rhetoric of their political and military leaders, Americans are used the idea that the US military can deliver total victory in any situation. The hangover from Vietnam is gone, Iraq leaves a bitter taste in ones mouth but the military's reputation among the American people is largely intact and Afghanistan has yet to have a real influece on US opinions of their armed forces. And culturally, the esteem with which society holds the military has never been higher. Thus, expectations for 'victory,' unavoidably defined expansively by the US people, are very high whenever the President commits troops. This is the reason I think the US leaders need to turn away from talking about victory over countries and regimes and focus, to use Slaughter's words on "shaping events and adapting to a continuous stream of changing challenges." Elkus notes that many Americans still identify WW2 as the pinnacle of US military success and that is precisely why the discource needs to move away from 'victory'. The frame of reference for victory is far too narrow and for most people requires a surrender and an exchange of sidearms. That just isn't going to happen and politicians need to stop encouraging the idea that it might. The first way to do this is to stop talking about victory.

Elkus is completely right that policymakers and strategists need to continue to focus on mission and strategic success (and better understand the difference between the two). But talking to the American people about military action in the future must take a more muted approach, one that emphasizes the inabillity of US military might to remake societies and enforce democracy. These things are incredibily difficult to do even with assistance from local forces and foreign allies and doing them alone looks, thankfully, largely out of the question based on the new Pentagon guidance. Victory is a word for what America will try and acheive in future military action but given public expectations of what it means, it is perhaps the wrong word.