Commander Dolan’s May 2012
Proceedings article suggests that the US Navy should respond to potential
Iranian aggression in the Straits of Hormuz from a distance, engaging the
Iranian navy in the Arabian Sea and IRGC assets in the Persian Gulf from
over-the-horizon. He argues that Iranian A2/AD capabilities are such that, in
order to conserve the force, the US should not contest the Straits and littoral
waters directly; the US navy should instead position its forces to wear down
and defeat Iran’s assets from afar. This strategy would potentially mean
surrendering control the straits to Iranian forces for a brief period of time
but, he argues, would safeguard US ships and provide a more certain method of
defeating the Iranians.
While Commander’s Dolan’s ideas
are provocative, his analysis does not deal comprehensively with Iran’s most
potent capabilities which are difficult, if not impossible, to deal with from a
distance. In addition, if Iran were to
close the Straits, even temporarily, alternative oil routes need to be found—and
options are limited. While the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline does allow some Emirati
oil to bypass the straits, its capacity is less than 9% of the Straits’ daily
traffic. Given the limitations of alternative routes, the US navy has focused
on confronting the Iranians within the Straits. This brief analysis outlines
major Iranian capabilities and the deployments the US has made in an attempt to
counter them.
Iran’s primary force in any Straits-closure
attempt would be the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Navy utilizing mines, small
boats (both torpedo and missile craft), and land-based anti-ship missiles. The
Iranian Navy only operates outside the Gulf and poses a significantly smaller
threat. Dolan’s article focuses primarily on IRGC-N’s missile threat and,
accurately, articulates a standoff strategy to defeat it. The US navy would
position guided missile ships and carrier-based planes in the North Arabian Sea
to counter land, air, and sea-launched Iranian missiles. However, this strategy
only deals with the most vulnerable third of Iran’s assets.
Mine warfare could cause havoc in
the constricted space of the straights, particularly among merchant vessels.
The US Navy is aware of this threat and has deployed 8 of its 14 Mine
Counter-Measure (MCM) ships to Bahrain. Additionally, IMCMEX12, the region’s
largest ever naval exercise, is currently underway with 30 national navies working
together to practice MCM techniques. However, US MCM ships are approximately 20
years old and are limited in number. Their supposed replacement, the Littoral
Combat Ship with an MCM unit, has yet to be deployed. Thus, though any attempt
by IRGC-N to lay mines would result in the US Navy quickly sinking the mine-laying
ships, the resulting minefield would still necessitate a weeks-long clearing
process.
The threat of IRGC small-boat-swarming tactics,
armed with both anti-ship missiles and torpedoes, is an equally worrisome
issue. These small craft, ranging from inshore patrol boats to coastal fast
attack craft, are generally armed with anti-ship missiles (many of Chinese
origin) or torpedoes. The US Navy’s response has been the forward deployment of
5 Cyclone-class patrol boats at Manama, with an additional 5 thought to be sent
forward within the last 6 months. The US Coast Guard also maintains a permanent
presence of 6 patrol boats in Bahrain. However, given the IRGC-N is thought to
have anywhere between 75-150 small craft, the US presence is certainly not decisive
and could find themselves overwhelmed by sheer numbers. Finally, Iran operates
a series of submarines (Qadir-class mini sub and several Russian built Kilo
class). US Navy ASW abilities suggest that smaller Qadir-class is the more
potent threat to Gulf shipping. However, their short range and questionable
combat effectiveness would likely limit their operations to the coastal waters
of Iran.
Any attempt by Iran to close the
Straits would, therefore, be a combined operation of surface ships utilizing
missiles and torpedoes, land-based anti-ship missiles and a mine-laying
campaign. This three-pronged approach creates difficulties for a US Navy that
has focused on standoff weaponry and large, expensive, high-capability ships.
However, this asymmetric conflict design does not mean the US Navy cannot regain
the initiative. By utilizing both
existing MCM and patrol ships assets alongside over-the-horizon capabilities,
the US can puts itself in the best position to deny Iran the ability to close
the Straits.
Standoff weaponry, including
carrier-borne aircraft, should be positioned in the Arabian Sea to confront
IRIN assets outside the Straits, destroy IRGC-N missile systems, and provide
air cover and ASW capabilities inside the Gulf. Meanwhile, MCM ships and USN/USCG
patrol boats, alongside helicopter MCM from Bahrain, would be assigned the
mission of dealing with IRGC-N small boats and mines. There would likely be
losses within this latter group (US Navy simulations in 2011 suggested swarming
tactics could sink up to 16 US ships in the Gulf). However, if the US is to
remain a guarantor of the free flow of commerce in the region, it must
demonstrate a willingness to take on Iran directly and prevent closure of the
Straits. This two-pronged response to Iranian aggression allows the US Navy to
use its standoff advantages to defeat Iranian A2/AD and static capabilities while
at the same time offering an in-situ defense against small boats, mine-laying
and ship-borne missile attacks. Maintaining the free flow of commerce through
the Straits in the face of Iranian aggression is both extraordinarily important
and difficult. For this reason, the US rightly dedicates significant assets
both inside and outside the Gulf to ensure Iran is not able to halt the flow of
oil.
