Professor Aaron Friedberg at KCL War Studies

Professor Aaron Friedberg, who has just published a new book on the US-China relationship and it's future, spoke last night at King's College London's War Studies department. While it's not my area of expertise by any means, I found it an interesting take on the future of America's relationship with China, particularly because if avoided the paranoia found in so many American analyses of China's increasing power. At the same time, he was anything but complacent about the challenges to the US posed by a more assertive China. 

The Professor put forward two central forces for cooperation and two central forces for tension. The cooperative forces are easy and are stated in most basic analyses--mutual economic gain and shared desire to avoid the risks of confrontation. The tensions are similarly easy to see--tension between rising powers and ideology. This much is certainly uncontroversial, though perhaps some would argue that there are other forces for cooperation such as shared interests and involvement in international institutions.

For America, there have been two prongs to its policy toward China, a policy that hasn't changed much since the presidency of the first President Bush. Firstly, the US has sought to engage China on a wide range of issues, from military to societal to economic. Engagement seeks to tame China into becoming a responsible stakeholder in the world system while slowly transforming it into a more liberal state. Second, the US has balanced China by cementing alliances, economic and military, in region. These include historical relationship with South Korea and Japan as well as newer "quasi-alliances" (Professor Friedberg's word) with Japan, Singapore and possibly Vietnam in the coming years. Balancing's goal is to "hold the ring" to maintain stability while engagement runs its course.

China has similarly pursued a consistent strategy over the last several decades, as it has attempted to make good on two long term goals--preserve the exclusive political writ of the CCP and make the world/Asia safe for authoritarianism. These goals have been pursued along three tracks. First, and most importantly, avoid confrontation and improve relations with the US and regional powers. Second, China has sought to build comprehensive national power, incorporating military, economic, technological and diplomatic facets. Third, China has advanced its interests incrementally, slowly moving out of their shell to strengthen themselves--and weaken the US--where possible but always avoiding open confrontation. 

In general terms Friedberg talked about where things stand now, arguing that by and large China has gotten the best of America over the last decade or so. He sees the US as being overly optimistic about the success of engagement and has ignored those areas where interests diverge instead of understanding China as a country with its own endgame. For instance, in dealing with North Korea's nuclear proliferation, China's desire to keep an important buffer state happy and secure matter more to it that any shared concern with the US over nonproliferation. China has also developed a series of economic ties with traditional US allies, particularly South Korea and Australia, that has forced those governments to recalculate how forcefully they can deal with China. 

However, he also addressed a series of recent events that have shown China to be increasingly aggressive and that have actually alienated countries that were slowly softening toward China. These events include the mess surrounding the North Korean torpedoing of a South Korean vessel, the arrest of Chinese fishing boat captain in Japan and China's increasingly aggressive posture and language regarding the South China Sea. The question, however, is whether this is simply a temporary aberration from China's traditional tactic of avoiding confrontation, or a sign of things to come as an increasingly powerful and assertive China begins its domination of the Western Pacific. Professor Friedberg was cagey as to which side of that debate he came down on, but it seemed clear he is skeptical that China will be happy to return to its traditional muted role for long.  

After Qaddafi--What role, if any, should America play

The end is nigh for Qaddafi and while it may yet be several days or even a week before he is captured or appears abroad, theColonel is no longer the Libyan ruler. The rebellion by the Libyan people, assisted by NATO's aiar campaign has taken 6 months--short by historical standards of insurgencies and rebellions, though longer than American and European populaces expected. But no matter, Qaddafi will be gone soon enough and beyond operational expenses (expensive yes, but peanuts compared to the west's adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq) the Libyan mission has been quick, cheap and relatively easy for America and (slightly less so) for its allies. 

However, now the truly difficult work begins, both for the Libyan people as they attempt to build a government and a state largely from scratch, and for NATO as it endeavors to find a way to assist that process. In a brief twitter exchange yesterday Daniel Serwer responded to Andrew Exum's and Marc Lynch's* concerns about a post-Qaddafi Libya by saying the EU should be the worrying and the US's role is simply to get them to step up. After all, it's their lake in their backyard. He is largely correct, and both Exum and Lynch seemed to agree (though RT not implying agreement etc). If anything is true it is that the US cannot afford, does not want and will not be able to assume control of yet another developmental mission in the greater Middle East. The countries that should take the lead in helping the Libyan National Transition Council (NTC) build a parliament, police force, judiciary system, military and so on are the countries that so agitated for action and support of the rebels in the first place. Britain and France. However, this position should not be taken to the extreme. Everyone knows that despite America pulling back from combat missions over Libya, without the drone reconnaissance (and ocasional strike), AWACS patrols, and other ISR and SAR assets the coalition forces were unlikely to succeed. America is even selling laser guided bombs to the European militaries as its allies have failed to stockpile enough. All this reflects a fact that is as true in the transition from war to post-conflict development as it was during the bombing campaign; America has certain unique assets that only it can bring to bear, assets that its allies rely and that the US should be careful but not stingy about supplying.

Two unique assets quickly occurred to me as I drafted the introduction though there are undoubtedly more, from which the Obama administration can pick and choose as requested by the Libyan people and NATO allies. First are the American special forces, particulary the Army special forces or Green Berets. As Gulliver over at Ink Spots demonstrated in his post last week, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), i.e. training foreign militaries, has historically been the primary mission for much of their history. It is only in the last ten years, with the necessities of Iraq and Afghanistan, that they have become known primarily as 'door-kickers'. Given the concern of some in the special forces community about moving away from their doctrinal strengths (h/t Gulliver) and the need for the new Libyan rebels to transition away from a brave but largely untrained militia to a professional fighting force, the US special forces are uniquely capable of providing the type of large scale training required. I should probably note here that I do not think any large scale deployment of US troops is necessary nor in any way desirable. That the Obama Administration kept any serious discussion of ground troops at bay is commendable and should be continued. But one of the first prerequisits for any stable state is its ability to secure its borders (as America has learnt to its cost in Iraq and Afghanstan) and so America should offer the NTC trainers for its newly formed military. A not inconsequinetial side benefit would be an early, and with luck and work, long and deep relationship between the US and new Libyan miltiaries that can help impart democratic norms such as respect for civilians and civilian rule. 

Insititutions of higher education are a second unique asset the United States possesses and should play a major role in Libya in the coming months and years. Again, it is not the fact of their existance that makes them unique but the scale. Great Britain has dozens of universities (all of which are struggling to educate British studens let alone provide assistance to Libya) whereas the US has hundreds. The United States should open up educational visas to any Libyan who wishes to come to the US to study public policy, economics, engineering and other subjects that the State Department deems vital to helping the new Libyan state grow and mature. A scholarship fund should be created, large snough to educate many students, and the existence of this program should be widely advertised throughout Libya--not just in Benghazi and Tripoli whose citizens dominate the political discourse as it is. In addition, the US should offer the NTC as many advisory visits as it wants from US univerisity and private sector experts-- in public policy, of course, but also in the areas such as civil engineering, police and judiciary formation and educational systems. The US government would be pay for these visits and should ensure that all these US-funded consulantants have both an understanding of Libya political realities and an appreciation that the new Libyan state cannot and will not mimic the West. While the scholarship program plays more directly to America's unique strenths (and with luck some of the students may stay, bolstering America's own lack of engineering students), given the vast size of the American unicersity system it will have the luxury of selecting experts who understand their field and the realities of Libya. Some people will undoubtedly claim the US cannot afford these programs. I would respond that the US invested well over 1 billion dollars over six months to remove Qaddafi from power. Surely it is justifiable to commit at least a similar amount to help set Libya on a path that will prevent the rise of another dictator?

During the air campaign over Libya the Obama administration offered a new vision of US foreign policy and power projection, one that did not require American troops to constantly be the tip of the spear. Instead, leveraging unique assets to support regional allies in pursuit of mutual goals (the protection of civilians and support of the rebels), the Administration has accomplished its goal-the removal of Qaddafi from power. Once Qaddafi has left Obama must transition to a similar supporting role that once again makes use of America's unique capabilitie. Now it will be assets such as force training and educational opportunities rather than Paveways and Predators that can aid NATO allies, the NTC and the Libyan people as they attempt to make the transition from rebellion to stable government and secure state. 

 

*Full Disclosure-Professor Lynch was my undergraduate thesis advisor.

The Question of How--A Response to Andrew Bacevich

Andrew Bacevich's latest missive in Salon has been roundly (and rightly) criticized for its unquestioned parroting of the misogynistic comparison President Obama's female advisors to certain classical monstrosities. I leave it to the classics scholars and and people more versed in these issues to parse the professor's meaning and mistake. However, his broader point deserves some attention of its own. In his essentially "damn them all' argument, Bacevich posits that no matter the 'whys' (and he argues they do not matter) of American involvement in the Middle East, Presidents Obama and Bush, Clinton, Bush and others, always end up with the same 'how:

 

When it comes to the Islamic world, for more than three decades now Washington's answer to how has been remarkably consistent: through the determined application of hard power wielded by the United States. Simply put, Washington's how implies a concerted emphasis on girding for and engaging in war.

Leaving aside the question of whether the 'why' matters, Professor Bacevich is still mistaken. Force is not a generic, uniform concept as the now decade-long debate over the role of counterinsurgency counterinsurgency in American strategy has shown us. Force can be applied with limitations and without, it can be applied in concert with allies or without, it can be applied via 'shock and awe' campaigns with phalanx of armored vehicles or through small special operations units making a big impact with a small footprint. Now, the intervention in Libya is certainly a use of force but failing to acknowledge how this application of force differs from others, renders the above analysis largely useless. For instance, did the Arab League act in concert with a popular rebel movement in Iraq in 2003 to call for UN-sanctioned military operations? Or when Clinton fired cruise missile after cruise missile throughout the 1990s? Does Bacevich really mean to suggest that all actions undertaken by the US military in the Middle East are equivalent in outcome. While I understand and agree with much of the concern over American/NATO intervention in Libya, the ease with which so many analysts fall back on simplistic and inaccurate analogies to previous conflicts is lazy at best. 

Bacevich's second major point is this (pardon the pasting of the 'harpies' comment):

What we can say for sure is this: by seeing the Greater Middle East as a region of loose nails badly in need of being hammered, the current commander-in-chief has claimed his place in the ranks of a long list of his warrior-predecessors.

The key point is this: like those who preceded them, neither Obama nor his Harpies (nor anyone else in a position of influence) could evidently be bothered to assess whether the hammer actually works as advertised -- notwithstanding abundant evidence showing that it doesn't.

I couldn't disagree more. In fact, the Obama administration seems to be bending over backwards to ensure that they are not enamored with the effects of the 'hammer.' They got NATO to take over official command as soon as possible and have largely stood back and let the UK and France take the lead as much as possible--along with any of the credit and most of the blame. They have encouraged and almost begged Middle Eastern allies to contribute to the mission and the UAE and Qatar have promised their F16s. The only thing missing in my opinion is a more overt effort to contribute to humanitarian aide but I can understand their reservation about sending in US-flagged ships at this delicate moment. This is exactly how an intervention is supposed to work. The US's military capabilities will be unavoidably needed to start with (no one else could fire off 100+ tomahawks in a night) but the transition to a backseat role has happened as quickly as anyone could have hoped. 

So while a 'hammer' has been used it bears more resemblance to a tack hammer than the sledge Americans are generally used to seeing brought to bear on an adversary. Such actions are not above criticism but criticism should start firmly grounded in the specific facts of the occasion and not with an predetermined narrative of America militarism.