The resurrection of the US amphibious warfare fleet

A new and illustrative naval vessel was christened this week in San Diego. The USNS Montford Point, the first of the US Navy’s three planned Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP), was built by General Dynamics and is designed to obviate the need for large deepwater ports in amphibious operations.

The christening of the Montford Point, largely unremarked on in the mainstream press, is an illustration of the US Navy’s growing focus on amphibious and special operations capabilities. While the new Ohio-class submarine or the new Ford-class aircraft carriers get most of the attention, recent actions by the US Navy suggest it is also intent on restoring amphibious capabilities that stagnated somewhat thanks to 10 years of war in Iraq and land-locked Afghanistan.

The primary capability of the Montford Point is to provide a platform to distribute vehicles and equipment directly onto landing craft, particularly the LCAC hovercraft and its eventual replacement. The main deck is designed to be lowered below water level, by taking on ballast, so that LCAC can drive right onto it to pick up cargo. Instead of an interior ‘well deck’ found on many amphibious ships, the whole ship is essentially a well deck. In conjunction with a new logistics system, this class will replace the need for an amphibious force to take control of a major port–a difficult task which can become a vulnerable bottleneck.

The MLP class comes on the heels of the deployment last year of the USS Ponce, a retrofitted amphibious warfare ship now designed as a helicopter carrier, special operations platform, and, reportedly, a UAV base. Alongside the new America-class of assault ships (the first is to be commissioned this year) that provide large helicopter landing facilities, these vessels emphasize the US military’s aim of being able to have a strong presence anywhere in the world, without the need for expensive and controversial land basing. In addition, these platforms improve the ability of the United States’, particularly the Marine Corps, ability to deploy anywhere at short notice with a combined arms force while at the same time reducing replenishment concerns.

As Brett Friedman has demonstrated in the Journal of Military Operations’, the fact that the US is unlikely to mount a full scale amphibious assault in the near future does not mean amphibious operations are nonexistent, or even rare. Indeed, amphibious operations run the gamut from the purely humanitarian (the US Navy was able to immediately respond to both the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and the Japanese tsunami in 2011) to the military (support of the NATO Libya campaign) to everything in between (such as seabasing for counter-terror operations against Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines). Particularly as Western populace’s support for large ground operations diminishes and as budget cuts take effect, the ability to support operations from the sea for a relatively small cost is a great advantage.

Despite a focus in Washington on AirSea Battle and the expected rise of China to a near-peer competitor, it is these smaller missions that will, and should, continue to occupy the bulk of American naval and Marine Corps operations. While ‘big ticket’ items like aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines are important for the US’s strategic posture, it is ships like the Ponce, the Montford Point and the America that will be called upon to deliver disaster relief, support allied operations, and, if needed, become the tip of the spear for limited operations.

 

Cross posted at World Outline

The resurrection of the US amphibious warfare fleet

A new and illustrative naval vessel was christened this week in San Diego. The USNS Montford Point, the first of the US Navy’s three planned Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP), was built by General Dynamics and is designed to obviate the need for large deepwater ports in amphibious operations.

The christening of the Montford Point, largely unremarked on in the mainstream press, is an illustration of the US Navy’s growing focus on amphibious and special operations capabilities. While the new Ohio-class submarine or the new Ford-class aircraft carriers get most of the attention, recent actions by the US Navy suggest it is also intent on restoring amphibious capabilities that stagnated somewhat thanks to 10 years of war in Iraq and land-locked Afghanistan.

The primary capability of the Montford Point is to provide a platform to distribute vehicles and equipment directly onto landing craft, particularly the LCAC hovercraft and its eventual replacement. The main deck is designed to be lowered below water level, by taking on ballast, so that LCAC can drive right onto it to pick up cargo. Instead of an interior ‘well deck’ found on many amphibious ships, the whole ship is essentially a well deck. In conjunction with a new logistics system, this class will replace the need for an amphibious force to take control of a major port–a difficult task which can become a vulnerable bottleneck.

The MLP class comes on the heels of the deployment last year of the USS Ponce, a retrofitted amphibious warfare ship now designed as a helicopter carrier, special operations platform, and, reportedly, a UAV base. Alongside the new America-class of assault ships (the first is to be commissioned this year) that provide large helicopter landing facilities, these vessels emphasize the US military’s aim of being able to have a strong presence anywhere in the world, without the need for expensive and controversial land basing. In addition, these platforms improve the ability of the United States’, particularly the Marine Corps, ability to deploy anywhere at short notice with a combined arms force while at the same time reducing replenishment concerns.

As Brett Friedman has demonstrated in the Journal of Military Operations’, the fact that the US is unlikely to mount a full scale amphibious assault in the near future does not mean amphibious operations are nonexistent, or even rare. Indeed, amphibious operations run the gamut from the purely humanitarian (the US Navy was able to immediately respond to both the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and the Japanese tsunami in 2011) to the military (support of the NATO Libya campaign) to everything in between (such as seabasing for counter-terror operations against Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines). Particularly as Western populace’s support for large ground operations diminishes and as budget cuts take effect, the ability to support operations from the sea for a relatively small cost is a great advantage.

Despite a focus in Washington on AirSea Battle and the expected rise of China to a near-peer competitor, it is these smaller missions that will, and should, continue to occupy the bulk of American naval and Marine Corps operations. While ‘big ticket’ items like aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines are important for the US’s strategic posture, it is ships like the Ponce, the Montford Point and the America that will be called upon to deliver disaster relief, support allied operations, and, if needed, become the tip of the spear for limited operations.

 

Cross posted at World Outline

Sulu standoff in Malaysia threatens peace treaty amid growing violence

My first article for World Outline, a news and analyst website run by former KCL War Studies folk. Check out their website.

The standoff between Sulu fighters and security forces in Malaysia has worrying implications for both Malaysian politics and a peace deal in the Philippines.

In a story that has largely escaped the attention of the western news media, the standoff between Sulu raiders and Malaysian police is now affecting relations between the two countries, the Malaysian political climate, and the success of a vital peace treaty in the Philippines.

Since the group of approximately 100 ‘invaders’ from the Sulu archipelago arrived near the Sabah town of Lahad Datu in early February, they have been surrounded by Malaysian security forces. However, since a failed raid last week, violence has become a recurring theme and between 27 and 31 people have been killed thus far.

Arriving by speedboat nearly four weeks ago, Jamalul Kiram III and his followers occupied a village, claiming part of Sabah territory for the Sultan of Sulu and his heirs. Several of the group claim to be the Sultan’s descendants. While only the latest chapter in a long-running dispute over who rightfully controls the region, this attempt to take Sabah by force is a new and unwelcome development. The violence began late last week when the Malaysian police attempted to storm the village. Two security officers and twelve of the Sulu fighters were killed in the firefight that ensued. Then, on Saturday, a group of Malaysian troops were apparently ambushed, while in a separate incident several more Sulu fighters were killed – bringing the death toll to approximately 20.

The fighting continued on Sunday and there have been reports that hostages have subsequently been taken. However, several of the news reports contradict each other and there is – as yet – little agreement on the exact number of people killed. Nevertheless, what is clear is that the situation has deteriorated dramatically and is causing wider problems for both the Malaysian and Philippine governments.

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak is required to call elections before the end of June and these events have thrown the campaign into disarray. The opposition has capitalised on the attack as proof of lax border security and the inability of the current government to protect Malaysians.

There are also an estimated 800,000 Filipinos living legally in Sabah who are facing a potential backlash. These concerns have caused the Philippines’ Foreign Secretary to fly to Malaysia in an effort to urge ‘maximum tolerance’ between the two populations.

Even more worryingly, across the straits the delicate peace agreement between the Filipino government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has been put at risk. After initial conciliatory statements, President Aquino last week called on the Sulu fighters to surrender ‘without conditions’. The Moro leader Murad Ebrahim responded by accusing the president of throwing fellow Filipino Muslims to the ‘Malaysian wolves’. Neither side has yet suggested delaying the final peace treaty, but the conclusive end of a 30+ year conflict is being put at risk by continued violence.

There is little doubt that the Malaysian security forces will eventually retake control of the villages and expel the remaining Sulu fighters. How it is done, and how long it takes, however, remains to be seen. The Malaysian government can little afford delays their perceived ability to protect Malaysian borders and the residents of Sabah, but a bloodbath is in no one’s interest and would fuel dangerous tensions between Sabah’s Malaysian and Filipino populations.

Finally, although the Philippine peace treaty is likely to be finalized, a bad ending to the standoff greatly increases the possibility of a breakaway group that would reject the deal. Much as the Islamic Liberation Front did 30 years ago when they broke away from the Moro National Liberation Front, this group would continue the insurgency in the Philippine archipelago, affecting Malaysia and the Philippines alike. That is a result all parties would do well to avoid.