Accounting for the lack of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) attacks on India since 2008 requires evaluation of several analytical levels, namely organizational, state and international. There are two clusters of reasons for LeT’s lack of attacks: first, internal LeT dynamics that have affected the group’s operational choices and, second, pressure applied by, and to, Pakistan’s ISI. The second set of reasons is dominant given the ISI’s influence and strength. A further contributing factor is the improvement of Indian counter-terrorism, particularly regional intelligence hubs and the new National Investigation Agency, though these advancements are certainly not determining factors.
The 2008 Mumbai assault was a departure in size, though not in style, from previous LeT activities. The group’s fidayeen attacks, begun in July 1999, generally involved 2-4 gunmen, meaning Mumbai was a significantly larger operation. American LeT operative David Headley’s plea deal indicates the shift was due to internal LeT politics, notably the need to retain control of and inspire younger, more extreme members, who were increasingly focused on Afghanistan rather than LeT’s traditional Kashmiri-centric area of operations. This explains the decision to increase the attack’s size during the final preparations. Mumbai should, therefore, be seen as a one-off ‘spectacular’ designed to reinvigorate the group and enhance its cohesion. It was not the beginning of a large-scale fidayeen offensive. In addition, by 2008 LeT had shifted its focus to concentrate on supporting and financing the Indian Mujahideen (IM) group. LeT was instrumental in setting up IM and supporting its bombing campaign but has never had operational control. LeT support for IM has continued, most notably with the 2010 Pune bombing.
LeT’s ideology, the final internal dynamic, suggests it sees further terrorism in India as counterproductive. LeT promotes Ahl-e-Hadith Islam and its ideology minimizes intra-Muslim conflict while concentrating on attacking non-believers. It is, therefore, supportive of Pakistani national integrity, which would come under serious threat if further Mumbai-like attacks occurred. This position was elucidated by Hafiz Saeed, leader of LeT’s charitable arm Jama’at- ud-Da’wah. He said that although LeT wants change within the Pakistani state, Pakistan is a defender of Muslims and thus LeT will not do anything that could damage the country. It is relatively unsurprising, therefore, that LeT has not implemented a major terrorist assault in India since 2008 because neither its organizational goals, ideology nor current strategy suggest it requires one.
LeT’s internal dynamics arguing against further terrorism in India complement the external forces dictating the group’s actions. Pakistan’s ISI and Military Intelligence have always maintained significant influence over the group due to their similar recruiting areas in Punjab; the fact that the government built the group’s military capabilities throughout the 1990s for use as a proxy force; and the suspected fact that the ISI maintains case officers for important LeT operatives. In addition, the ISI has guided the LeT’s organizational evolution in order to allow the group’s continued operation while providing Pakistan with plausible deniability. Pakistan’s security services possess, therefore, a high level of control over LeT activities and operations; indeed, David Headley has claimed that his ISI handler, a Major Iqbal, was aware of the Mumbai targets and assisted operational planning.
After the Mumbai attacks, the US and India, along with the international community, put significant pressure on the Pakistani government to crack down on Kashmir-focused militant groups. American pressure in particular forced Pakistan to create a new strategy for its relationship with LeT. According to regional expert Anatol Lieven, author of the new book Pakistan: A Hard Country, and others, the new Pakistani strategy has been to ensure LeT does not attack either India or the West while at the same time retaining its ties with the group and ensuring it maintains its military capabilities. This approach has allowed Pakistan to maintain both its proxy force and needed international relationships. The Pakistani government and LeT understand that striking India in the short-term would damage Pakistani national interests and could provoke a full-scale war. The LeT and Pakistani security forces have been allies for 20 years because of this confluence of ideological and strategic viewpoints. It is this shared view, combined with the influence applied by the ISI, that accounts for the lack of LeT attacks in India since 2008.
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